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Dust explosions pose a serious hazard to both personnel and equipment in industries that handles 
combustible powders. Although prevention and mitigation technology of dust explosions has progressed 
greatly, continual accidents in the process industries demonstrate the need for improved knowledge in this 
area (Mercan, 2016; Russo et al., 2017). On July 16, 2007, a primary explosion followed by secondary 
explosions happened in the Cordero mill (Italy) and 5 persons died (Marmo et al., 2012). The accident 
occurred at the end of the loading operation of a tanker, when a surplus of flour was overcharged. This extra 
amount was then pneumatically conveyed to a silo placed in the flour-warehouses, by connecting the tanker to 
the pneumatic transport line through one of the tanker hoses. The flour was loaded at a low flow rate, and 
hence a low concentration of flour in the duct occurred. The source of ignition of the dust cloud was attributed 
to an electrostatic arc that took place in the pneumatic transport duct (Marmo et al., 2012). The technical 
enquire found signs of the explosion in the duct: internal pressure provoked evident deformation of the duct. 
As widely discussed in the literature (Fiorentini and Marmo 2019; Marmo et al., 2013), Computational Fluid 
Dynamics can be a valid aid to forensic engineering because it allows to discern the incidental sequence that 
is more adherent to the evidence. The aim of this work is to reproduce the conditions present in the mill at the 
time of the accident using the CFD-code DESC, which is being developed for simulating dust explosions in 
complex geometries. The results obtained from the simulations were compared to the damage observed after 
the accident in order to identify the more credible scenario. Simulations with different levels of flour in the silo, 
concentration of dust in the air mixture and position of ignition were performed. Analysis of results revealed 
the effect of different parameters on the severity of dust explosion, not only limited to the case study 
investigated, in order to adopt the appropriate prevention and protection measures. 
1. Case study 
1.1 Plant description 
The flour mill Cordero was located in the town of Fossano. It was constituted by a main rectangular masonry 
building of four storey plus a basement and a more recent three-storey construction where were located the 
products warehouse and the offices. Along the length of the building, on one side there was a large courtyard 
for the movement of vehicles and on the other side a second courtyard was near a road in the village. The 
production area was located in the main building, where the four main sections were separated by brick thick 
walls. Entry to the rooms was through an internal staircase and a hoist. The “B” rooms were used to produce 
wheat flour, and the “A” rooms for the flour storage and for the preparation of the wheat for milling operations. 
A plan of the basement of the main building is reported in Figure 1.  
The other floors were similar. Leaning against the East wall (towards the sacks warehouse) there were two 
metal flour silos that rose up to the second floor. Nearby there were bucket elevators. Against the middle wall 
of the building there were, from west to east, a freight elevator and 6 flour silos (the first was made of metal, 
the other made of wood) that rose up to the top floor and several bucket elevators. In the basement there was 
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a fabric silo supported by a metal frame. The floor was made of concrete with a steel beam structure. The floor 
of the 4th level was made by wooden planks. 
 
 
Figure 1. Plan of the basement of the main building. 
1.2 The accident 
On July 16, 2007, a tanker was loaded of flour transported by a bucket elevator to a cochlea and by gravity 
fall. The accident occurred at the end of the loading operation of the tanker, when a surplus of flour was 
overcharged. This extra amount was then pneumatically conveyed to a wooden silo placed in the flour-
warehouses, by connecting the tanker to the pneumatic transport line through one of the tanker hoses. The 
flour was loaded at a low flow rate, and hence a low concentration of flour in the duct occurred. During loading 
and unloading operations the truck was not grounded. The technical enquire ascribed the ignition of the 
explosion to an electrostatic arc that took place in the pneumatic transport duct (Marmo et al., 2012). 
Specifically, it found evident signs of the explosion in the duct which was deformed by internal overpressure. 
After the ignition, the flame front arrived immediately to the silo where the flour was being conveyed. Since the 
large amount of suspended flour present in the silo, a very strong secondary explosion occurred, and then 
spread to other zones of the building. 
1.3 The damage 
In Figure 1, A and B are the areas of the main building of the mill which underwent a considerable, but not 
complete, collapse.  
In the basement, the collapse of all the B rooms and of their equipment occurred. Most of the equipment (i.e. 
plansicthers, mills, cyclones, cochlea and elevator ducts) was not burned by the fire. With regards to the walls, 
the north one collapsed, but the internal ones were only damaged. Also, the stability of internal staircase, 
which was found in its original position, was compromised.  
On the contrary, in the A area of the basement the walls and equipment were primary damaged by the fire, 
which had burned over a long period of time (Figure 2). The internal overpressure caused damage to the 
ceiling of A0 area as well as that of the A1 area (Figure 2). The hoist bay was destroyed by internal 
overpressure, while the overpressure from the hoist caused major damage to the structures on the side of the 
building.  
The roof above north and south wings was torn away and projected at a considerable distance. Debris launch 
distance is much higher toward south than toward north as the rooms on the A side were certainly affected by 
a strong internal overpressure of intensity depending on the altitude, which caused obvious projections of the 
structures and debris towards the outside and upwards. On the contrary, the rooms B were mainly affected by 
a static collapse that has caused the collapse of the structure and the machines: in fact, most of the rubble is 
located within the perimeter or very short distance. All the other rooms were marginally affected by the 
explosion, while some, like the sacks warehouse, suffered from the long fire that followed the explosion. 
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Figure 2. Damage of the main building from the exterior (a) and inside the A area (b,c).  
With regards to the transfer pipe from the truck to the silo, some parts were found in their original place, but 
other parts were found from the debris heap and some were lost. Moreover, the flanges of the pipe showed 
the typical deformation due to high internal pressure. Because of the overpressure, the material suffered much 
higher stresses than the elastic limit, and thus a permanent deformation. 
2. CFD simulations 
2.1 DESC code 
DESC (Dust Explosion Simulation Code) was a CFD code developed to simulate dust explosions in industrial 
complex geometries (Skjold and Eckhoff, 2016). Skjold et al. (2005, 2006) simulated with DESC large-scale 
dust explosion experiments in silos. This model was a modified version of a CFD code called FLACS (Flame 
Acceleration Simulator) which was developed for the simulation of gas explosions. It has estimated potential 
overpressures in several case studies and accidents (Russo et al., 2017). The code solves the Reynolds-
Averaged Navier- Stokes (RANS) equations for mass, enthalpy, momentum, and species. The RANS 
equations are closed using the k-ε turbulence model. The combustion model consists of a flame model and a 
burning velocity model. In DESC, the burning velocity model entails that the laminar burning velocity is roughly 
estimated from measured pressure-time curves in a 20-litre vessel. The code was based on a finite volume 
technique with a weighted upwind/central differencing scheme for the convective term. First-order time 
integration was used. The time step was limited according to the default values of CFLC and CLFV numbers, 
which for explosion simulations are CFLC =5.0 and CFLV = 0.5, which means that in each time step the 
pressure can propagate 5 cells and the flow 0.5 cells. 
2.2 Simulation parameters 
The geometry of the A area of the main building (28.2x11.7x17.0 m3) was reconstructed in DESC with CASD 
code as shown in figure 3. The grid used is uniform and the cell size is 10 cm with a total of 12,217,500 cells 
to obtain accurate results inside the simulation volume (Figure 3). Some objects of the A area, which include 
the roof, the windows, the doors, some walls and the floor of the building and the walls of the silos, are 
represented by pressure relief panels. These devices allow to define objects with a dynamic behaviour when 
overpressure is detected on the surface of the panel. The characteristics of the panels (267 in total) are 
reported in Table 1 as obtained from NFPA 921 (2008). The fuel properties were set defining cloud volume, 
dust concentration, and thermodynamic and chemical data of fuel. The explosion parameters (Pmax=8.6 barg, 
Kst=150 bar m/s) of dust are those reported in literature for wheat flour (Mittal, 2013), as obtained in 20-L 
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sphere. This is the standard apparatus for dust explosion tests, through the generation of a uniform dust/air 
cloud inside the vessel (Di Sarli et al., 2015; Sanchirico et al., 2015). 
In the simulation only the first explosion was considered. The dust cloud was assumed to fill the pipe, used to 
transfer the flour from the trucks to the warehouse, and the silo. Simulation were run by changing the dust 
concentration in the pipe and in the silo in the range 250- 2000 g/m3, and by changing the volume of dust 
cloud from 1/3 to 2/3 of the volume of the silo. The bottom part of the silo (1/3 of the volume) was assumed to 
be completely full of flour. The ignition source, with an energy of 10 mJ, was located at different heights inside 
the silo (i.e. at bottom (3.55m), at half height (7.25m), and at the top (9.25m) of the silo). 
 
a) b) 
Figure 3. Geometry of the A area of the building (a) and grid (b) used in simulations. 
Table 1: Characteristics of pressure relief panels 
Object Failure pressure (barg) Weight (kg/m2) 
Glass windows 0.03 10 
Fire protection doors 0.07 157 
Hoist doors 0.07 395 
Brick walls (20 cm thick) 0.48 1800 
Concrete floor 0.25 625 
Wooden silo walls  0.20 25 
Roof panels 0.14 40 
Under-roof panels 0.14 50 
 
To follow the value of parameters as temperature, maximum pressure (Pmax), dust concentration, velocity in 
time and space, some monitors points were set inside the simulation volume. The monitors were located 
inside the pipe, the silo, the roof, the hoist and the good receipt area as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Positions of the monitor points. 
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3. Results 
Simulations were performed for various scenarios with different levels of flour in the silo, concentration of dust 
and position of ignition. The overpressures predicted for each scenario in the different monitor points were 
compared with the failure pressure of the various objects. From the comparison, it was possible to define the 
scenario that is compatible with the damage observed after the explosion. It corresponds to the scenario with 
the silo only partial filled with flour (1/3 of volume), concentration of dust in the dust cloud of 2000 g/m3 (higher 
than the stoichiometric value) and the ignition at the top of the silo. Results of the simulations were reported in 
figure 5 for this scenario. They showed that it can predict: the collapse of the silo, because of the overpressure 
increase along the silo length from the top (Pmax = 0.15 barg) to the bottom of the silo up the failure value 
(Pmax>0.20 barg). Moreover, it can describe the propagation of the blast wave into the pipe and, as 
consequence of the silo collapse, then in the goods receipt area, where the under-roof and of roof panels fell. 
The propagation of the blast wave to the hoist, from the top to the bottom, with the collapse of the hoist door 
(Pmax>0.07 barg), and then to the basement where overpressure as high as 0.27 barg caused the collapse of 
the concrete floor (Figure 6) and consequently of the flour bins. The large amount of dust dispersed in the 
area, because of the poor housekeeping, ignited by the blast wave, was then the cause of multiple explosions 
occurred in the plant.  
 
Figure 5. Pmax vs time in the monitor points located in the hoist, silo, pipe and goods receipt area. 
 
Figure 6. Map of Pmax reached in the hoist and in the basement (at 960 ms). 
Hoist Silo 
Pipe Goods receipt area 
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4. Conclusions 
The case study here analysed showed that ordinary and unusual operations, especially those of loading and 
unloading silos, bins, storage houses are the recurrent cause of uncontrolled explosions. Proper procedures 
should be defined when such operations have to be carried out in order to reduce the risk of explosions. 
Deflagration venting can reduce the impact of dust cloud explosions by controlling the release of the explosion 
energy. Damage to the remaining structure and equipment is then minimized. Good housekeeping in 
processing areas is important to prevent and mitigate dust explosions. In particular, to prevent secondary dust 
explosions, dust accumulation has to be minimized. Designing and maintaining equipment to prevent dust 
leaks, using dust collectors, eliminating flat surfaces and other areas where dust can accumulate, ensuring 
good housekeeping, and sealing hard-to-clean areas (such as the area above a suspended ceiling) can 
effectively prevent secondary dust explosions. Moreover, this paper demonstrates that computational fluid 
dynamics can be a valid aid to forensic engineering because it allows to discern the incidental sequence that 
is more adherent to the evidence. This despite the investigation must necessarily base the bases on a solid 
activity of evidence collection. 
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